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ABSTRACT
Security technology often follows a systems design approach that
focuses on components instead of users. As a result, the users’
needs and values are not sufficiently addressed, which has impli-
cations on security usability. In this paper, we report our lessons
learned from applying a user-centered security design process to a
well-understood security usability challenge, namely key authen-
tication in secure instant messaging. Users rarely perform these
key authentication ceremonies, which makes their end-to-end en-
crypted communication vulnerable. Our approach includes collab-
orative design workshops, an expert evaluation, iterative story-
board prototyping, and an online evaluation.
While we could not demonstrate that our design approach re-
sulted in improved usability or user experience, we found that user-
centered prototypes can increase the users’ comprehension of se-
curity implications. Hence, prototypes based on users’ intuitions,
needs, and values are useful starting points for approaching long-
standing security challenges. Applying complementary design ap-
proaches may improve usability and user experience further.
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• Security and privacy → Authentication; Usability in secu-
rity andprivacy;Keymanagement; •Human-centered comput-
ing → Participatory design; Interface design prototyping.
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There is a broad consensus that users should not be required to
make complicated security decisions that they cannot make in an
informed way. However, users are still required to proactively per-
form complex security tasks that they hardly understand. An exam-
ple of such a security task is the authentication of keys when using
secure messaging apps. We argue that it is worthwhile to consider
users from the beginning of the design process for these kinds of
security tasks. To foster discourse on design methods in usable se-
curity, we applied user-centered design to a well-understood chal-
lenge in usable security, namely authentication ceremonies to au-
thenticate or verify keys in instant messaging apps and report our
findings and lessons learned in this paper.
In November 2018, theDutch police decrypted 258,000messages
sent with the E2EE messenger IronChat [31]. Investigations by a
Dutch news network [19, 36] revealed that police officers most
likely changed all encryption keys, thereby deploying a large-scale
MitM attack against IronChat’s users. Affected users could have de-
tected and mitigated this attack if they had used an authentication
ceremony to authenticate the used encryption keys. However, few
users are aware of these ceremonies [41], and those who are aware
have problems conducting them correctly [22, 37, 44].
Most of these authentication ceremonies are based on much
older methods to securely pair multiple devices owned by the same
user [4, 18, 23, 25]. Following a traditional SystemsDesign approach,
thesemethods have been repurposed for public-key authentication
in mobile messaging while overlooking that the two involved de-
vices are owned by different users who are typically not co-located.
Involving multiple people introduces social aspects to the au-
thentication ceremony that were not considered before: e.g., users
may feel a potential discomfort when asking others to authenti-
cate or may be embarrassed not to know how to use security fea-
tures [40]. After discovering that existing ceremonies do not work
well, priorwork focused primarily on incremental improvements [43,
46] or proposed to remove users from the loop [29, 42] (which po-
tentially leads to a lack of trust [26, 32]). Most incremental improve-
ments use an Activity-Centered Design approach to remove possi-
ble usability issues, which continues to be important and neces-
sary yet leaves other aspects untouched. Even after all these impor-
tant scientific contributions using different design approaches, au-
thentication ceremonies still struggle with users’ comprehension
of their security benefits, long completion times, and consequently
low adoption rates.
In this paper, we discuss if and how authentication ceremonies
could benefit from an alternative User-Centered Design approach.
Using this approach, we design authentication experiences from
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the ground up, involving prospective users, security experts, and
a UX expert in the design and evaluation procedures. This integra-
tion allows (a) exploring the users’ design space of authentication,
and (b) incorporating security and UX requirements to enhance
user-generated prototypes.
We applied a four-stage User-Centered Design process: (1) five
collaborative design workshops with ten potential users to gather
ideas and drawings that reflect users’ perceptions of authentication
ceremonies and trust establishment, (2) a security evaluation that
narrowed the design space, (3) an iterative storyboard prototyp-
ing approach with 18 participants to improve usability and collect
participants’ preliminary security perceptions, and (4) an online
evaluation of the prototypes on Amazon MTurk with 𝑁 = 131
participants.
The evaluation indicated that exposure to the combination lock
prototype improved participants’ understanding of the security ben-
efits concerning different types of attackers (compared to Signal’s
current ceremony). This understanding of security benefits likely
affects the frequency with which users will conduct authentication
ceremonies. Our design approach did not seem to improve other
factors, such as usability and user experience. Since these factors
are equally important for building authentication ceremonies that
people will use, we suggest designers apply complementary de-
sign approaches to improve them. We report the methodological
lessons that we learned from exploring user-centered and partic-
ipatory techniques for security design. We are confident that our
exploratory contribution sparks an interdisciplinary discourse on
when and how to consider prospective users throughout the design
process of security technology.
2 RELATEDWORK AND BACKGROUND
Designing secure experiences. Dan Saffer [34] divides interaction
design into four approaches: (1) User-Centered Design: designers
translate users’ needs and goals, (2) Activity-Centered Design: de-
signers create tools for specific actions, (3) Systems Design: design-
ers focus on components of a system, and (4) Genius Design: de-
signers’ skill and wisdom used to make a product.
Using this categorization, we classify the creation of the origi-
nal authentication ceremonies as a mixture of systems design and
genius design. The adoption of device pairing mechanisms that
were not intended for this use case corresponds to a systems de-
sign approach, and the lack of considerations for the users’ needs
is common in genius design. The suggestions for improvements
that we presented above [39, 42, 43, 46] mainly employ activity-
centered design. They all closely examine the process of authenti-
cation and try to remove barriers, which is important and effective
work. However, more fundamental questions about users’ needs
and goals can easily be overlooked when continuous improvement
of existing systems is the goal.
Zurko et al. [47] already advocated for user-centered security de-
sign in the 1990s. In 2017, Dodier-Lazaro et al. [14] condemned that
many security “improvements” stem from a paternalistic mindset
that ignores users’ values. Mathiasen et al. [26, 27] proposed an
experience-based design approach to enable secure experiences.
Weber et al. [45] used participatory design to draft SSL warning
messages. Gorski et al. [20] used a similar approach to create warn-
ing messages for developers that use cryptographic libraries.
History of pairing mechanisms. In the early 2000s, the secure
pairing of devices emerged as a heavily studied research topic [4,
18, 23, 28]. The proposed pairing methods were designed to pair
two or more devices owned by a single user. The comparative us-
ability study by Kobsa et al. [25] showed that in cases where both
devices had screens, a comparison of PINs, sentences, or images
receives the highest usability scores. Starting in 2010 with TextSe-
cure (later renamed to Signal), secure end-to-end-encrypted mes-
saging has become a de facto standard in mobile messaging. Many
of these messengers used the aforementioned device pairing meth-
ods to implement their authentication ceremonies. However, while
device pairing only involves one user, authentication ceremonies
in secure messaging involve two users who are potentially not
even co-located. Pairing methods involving multiple users are also
referred to as social pairing.
In 2011, Uzun et al. [40] criticized that: (1) existing pairing meth-
ods have been devised by security professionals with little regard
for their usability, and (2) that it is not possible to reduce the prob-
lem of social pairing to personal pairing of devices. Social pairing
introduces an additional layer of necessary interaction and adds
social context such as potential embarrassment or discomfort to
the problem. Ignoring those social aspects of security effects may
have severe downsides, as suggested by the increasing body of re-
search about their importance for security adoption. Gaw et al. [17]
found that even employees of a security-concerned activist group
considered the social implications before sending encrypted mails.
Having the recipients invest extra effort to decrypt “unimportant”
mails was considered rude. Das et al. present qualitative [11] and
quantitative [12] evidence that social processes affect the (non-
)adoption of security features. Exposure to many feature-adopting
friends increases the likelihood of adoption and vice versa. Abu-
Salma et al. [1] found that an important factor for the adopting
secure messengers is the friends’ opinion about its security. Ruoti
et al. [32] showed that hiding security mechanisms can decrease
users’ trust in them.
Lack of adoption of currently deployed authentication ceremonies.
Using device pairing methods for messengers’ authentication cere-
monies without further considering their context has proven to be
insufficient. As an increasing amount of research about the failure
rates of these authentication ceremonies demonstrates: Herzberg
et al. [22] studied the usability of WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, and
Signal.They found that (1) participants were not aware of the need
to authenticate, and (2) 56.5% of the participants failed to authen-
ticate in all messengers after being instructed to do so. Schröder
et al. [37] found that the majority of participating CS students
failed to detect and mitigate MitM attacks using Signal’s authen-
tication ceremony. Vaziripour et al. [44] compared authentication
ceremonies of Viber, WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger. They
found that only 14% of their study participants successfully verified
the key material without further explanation. When Vaziripour
et al. [41] surveyed Iranian Telegram users, they found that only
29.6% had ever used the authentication ceremony in text conversa-
tions.
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Proposed improvements of authentication ceremonies. Researchers
have tried to improve the authentication situation mostly in two
different aspects: (1) streamlining the users’ authentication activ-
ity, or (2) removing the users from the loop. In the first category,
Tan et al. [39] focused on improving success rates by identifying
a suitable key representation and mode of comparison. Vaziripour
et al. [43] streamlined Signal’s ceremony by providing easy access
and additional guidance. Wu et al. [46] produced new visual in-
dicators, new notification dialogs, and a new simplified notifica-
tion flow. In the second category, Vaziripour et al. [42] partially
removed users from the loop by using Keybase for an authentica-
tion method based on social media. Melara et al. [29] proposed a
key transparency log that would remove users entirely from the
authentication. All these approaches have resulted in valuable im-
provements regarding specific aspects of authentication ceremonies.
Few of these approaches have considered the social aspects of au-
thentication ceremonies or the users’ need for a secure experience.
Hence, they are important first steps towards solving the challenge.
Those aspects need to be addressed from the ground up during the
design of security features.
Our work aims to promote the adoption of user-centered secu-
rity design by presenting a four-stage design process (see Section 3)
that goes beyond the initial ideation of dialogs and is applicable to
entire security tasks. The remaining sections exemplify this design
process on the use case of authentication ceremonies in secure in-
stant messaging.
3 DESIGN METHOD
User-Centered Design involves users at every step of the design
process and focuses on their goals and requirements. Usually, this
process is iterative in nature and driven by evaluation. We chose
our process with two main goals in mind: (1) exploring the de-
sign space from the users’ perspective – including a security eval-
uation of the specific suggestions and extracting general themes
about authentication from the qualitative data; (2) comparing the
most promising of the candidates with an existing authentication
ceremony – necessarily these candidates need to be fleshed out
and developed further for a meaningful comparison. Users are the
main focus of our research, but they are neither security nor UX
experts – we do not expect them to design usable and secure cere-
monies on their own. Security experts are necessary to contextual-
ize participants’ conceptual ideas and match them to existing secu-
rity mechanisms. UX experts are indispensable to designing usable
interactions with great security experience. Above considerations
and our comprehensive literature survey resulted in a four-stage
design process as presented in Figure 1:
(1) Collaborative DesignWorkshops.We start by collecting users’
ideas about how authentication should work including their
goals and requirements. We apply a participatory design ap-
proach by conducting collaborative design workshops. Par-
ticipatory design considers the users’ cooperation with de-
signers as a possibility to bridge the gap between the users’
tacit knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is hard to communi-
cate, and the designers’ abstract and analytic knowledge [38].
We structured these workshops similar to the participatory
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Figure 1: Overview of the design-process and the involved
parties. We describe each of the steps in a separate section
in the remaining paper.
(1) participants reported about their experience with secure
messengers, (2) we created a shared language aboutMitM at-
tacks and authentication, and (3) participants designed and
discussed conceptual authentication ceremonies. Section 4
provides a detailed description of the collaborative design
workshops.
(2) Narrowing Down the Design Space. The design workshops
resulted in a design space with many creative conceptual
ideas. We conducted a security evaluation to narrow this de-
sign space to feasible ideas. We selected concepts that users
mentioned commonly and perceived as secure. If possible,
we matched those concepts with security mechanisms that
actualized the concepts’ perceived security.We removed con-
cepts that participants mentioned rarely and concepts with-
out matching security mechanisms. Section 5 provides a de-
tailed description.
(3) Iterative Storyboard Prototyping. After selecting viable con-
cepts, we design prototypes based on them. We refine and
evaluate these prototypes with users in an iterative process.
We apply prototyping techniques because they can also be
used to analyze the work process of prospective users and
simulate possible futurework [8]. For each concept, we sketched
all possible states of the user interface, which resulted in
a storyboard. We presented these storyboard prototypes to
potential users and asked them to describe the concepts be-
hind them and estimate the prototypes’ security benefits.
Then, we encouraged them to redesign the storyboards us-
ing pen and paper. After two iterations, we presented the
storyboards and the feedback we received to a UX expert
with several years of experience and improved them accord-
ingly. Section 6 provides a detailed description of the itera-
tive storyboard prototyping.
(4) Evaluation. After concluding the iterative development of
prototypes, we evaluate the prototypes’ secure experience
and usability with prospective users. In a between-subjects
online study, we evaluate the three resulting prototypes against
a storyboard prototype of Signal’s authentication ceremony.
We recruit participants on AmazonMTurk and randomly as-
sign conditions. Afterward, they respond to a questionnaire
about the prototypes’ usability, user experience, perceived
security, and protection against different threats. Section 7
provides a detailed description of the evaluation.
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Security requirements. Thepurpose of authentication ceremonies
is to mitigate MitM attacks. To do this securely, the conversation
partners have to compare the key material they use. The conver-
sation is secure if all conversation partners agree on the correct
key material. Comparing key material is possible in three ways:
(1) out-of-band, (2) in-band, and (3) using zero-knowledge proofs.
For the first kind of comparison, the conversation partners have
to meet, which requires planning for potential future security re-
quirements. The second and third types of comparison allow an
in-the-moment approach to security. In our study, we did not pre-
scribe any method of application in order to not restrict the intu-
itions of our participants.
Before conversation partners decide to use an authentication
ceremony they have to negotiate the need for one.The person who
identifies the need for additional security has to explain the pur-
pose and necessity of authentication ceremonies. This explanation
requires at least a high-level view of potential attackers’ capabil-
ities. Additionally, the user experience of the ceremony needs to
provide convincing evidence of its protective power – even if users
do not exactly understand its technical background.
Ethical considerations. For all three parts of this work, we col-
lected basic demographic data but no personally identifiable infor-
mation. For the workshop, we collected the participants’ email ad-
dresses to organize the workshops and communicate the results.
These were stored separately from the study data. All participants
were informed about the purpose and procedure of the study. Be-
fore theworkshop, we asked all participants to sign a consent form;
for the iterative storyboard prototyping, we asked for verbal con-
sent. The online study had a consent form on the first page, includ-
ing all necessary information on data collection and processing.
We compensated all participants for their time. Our university’s
ethical review board (ERB) approved the study.
4 COLLABORATIVE DESIGNWORKSHOPS
We conducted workshops to collect the prospective users’ ideas
of authentication ceremonies, e.g., how they imagined the process
and what motivation they need to complete it. Similar to Weber
et al. [45] we divided each workshop into three phases: (1) discus-
sion of experiences with secure messaging, (2) creating a shared
language for basic security concepts, and (3) prototyping concep-
tual ceremonies. In the first phase we asked all participants about
their common messenger usage. Additionally, we encouraged par-
ticipants to report negative and positive experiences with these
tools. The goal of this phase was to acquaint the participants with
each other and to identify general challenges with secure messag-
ing.
During the second phase, we presented a slide show (included
in the supplementary material) explaining end-to-end encryption,
threat models, andMitM attacks to create a common base of knowl-
edge and to establish a common language among the participants.
In the last phase, we asked the participants to provide prototypes
of conceptual authentication ceremonies and to explain their ideas
verbally and through drawings. In the beginning of this prototyp-
ing phase, we asked the participants to provide suggestions on how
to ensure that they are communicating with the intended person
if they could meet in person only once or not at all. Later on, we
asked them how they establish trust in the offline world, and if
and how those strategies could be translated to electronic commu-
nication. After about an hour we debriefed the participants and
discussed remaining open questions.
Analysis. We collected different types of data: a set of drawings
of conceptual prototypes, audio recordings, and our written notes.
Two independent coders traversed the notes and corresponding
drawings to systematically assign codes, a process known as open
coding. We used the audio recordings to clarify misleading notes or
drawings, which were difficult to understand. The resulting inter-
coder agreement (Krippendorff’s 𝛼 = 0.69 for the experience re-
ports and 𝛼 = 0.67 for the prototypes) allows us to draw tenta-
tive conclusions from the data. We grouped the resulting codes
into categories to identify the most common concepts for authen-
tication ceremonies among our participants. The full protocol and
codebook is presented in the supplementary material. Since the
workshops were conducted in a different language the researchers
translated the codebook, quotes, and the shown drawings.
Pilot study. We conducted a pilot study consisting of three ses-
sions with one participant each. Contrary to the rest of the study,
the participants had basic knowledge about cryptography. Since
those participants came up with rather unusual prototypes for au-
thentication ceremonies, we assumed that the procedure would
also work for other participants. Based on the pilot study we con-
cluded that the notion of trust needs to be well-defined when ask-
ing participants how they would establish trust. Therefore, we de-
cided to add two offline trust scenarios to our study design: (1)
meeting a previously unknown bank advisor, and (2) handing over
a package that was accepted for an unknown neighbour.
Recruitment and participants. We conducted five sessions with
two participants each.We invited interested users who used secure
messaging applications, who described themselves as having a lay
person’s understanding of cryptography, and who did not have
concrete threat models in mind. We deliberately excluded partici-
pants with either a background in cryptography, or with concrete
threat models. Both types of participants will already know about
authentication ceremonies and have preconceived notions on how
they should work – which would narrow their design space. We
created a dedicated website to inform about the study and adver-
tised it via email, Facebook, and Twitter. Additionally, we used
snowball recruitment to quickly find interested and qualified par-
ticipants. We compensated them for their time with food and non-
alcoholic drinks during the sessions, and by offering future secu-
rity advice (which one participant accepted).
All ten participants either graduated from a university or were
currently attending one. Four participants received some kind of
training related to computer science, but had no further knowl-
edge in security or cryptography. Seven participants were female
and three were male. The average age was 28.2 (min=22, max=35,
sd=4.76). The participants self-reported their knowledge on cryp-
tography and IP networks on a scale from one (“very little”) to six
(“very much”). The participants rated their knowledge about cryp-
tography (m=2, sd=1.3) as well as IP networks (m=2, sd=1.6) as low.
This reflects that our target population should only have a lay per-
son’s understanding of cryptography.
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4.1 Results
In the following, we present the experience reports, the most com-
mon conceptual prototypes that came up during the workshops,
and the priorities and expectations that participants explicitly named.
Experience reports. At the beginning of each session, participants
reported on their experience with secure instant messengers. Con-
venience was the participants prime reason to praise messengers,
e.g. Telegram and WhatsApp have large user base and work on all
platforms. Peer pressure is an important reason for choosing mes-
sengers: “If I have a close friend who insists on only using WhatsApp
and I really want to communicate with him, then I am forced to use
WhatsApp, even if I don’t want to – otherwise I have no way of com-
municating with that friend”. Features were equally important for
users, e.g., participants liked Telegram for its sticker packages. All
participants expressed annoyance about the diversity of apps and
lacking inter-operability. Some participants criticized messengers
that require a phone number. Signal but also to a lesser degree Tele-
gram were criticized for their lacking quality of service. Many par-
ticipants did not trust WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger because
of Facebook’s bad privacy reputation. Interestingly, usability did
not seem to be a major concern for our participants. Participants
were mostly unaware of authentication ceremonies’ existence.The
few aware participants perceived them as confusing rather than
helpful: “I don’t really understand how it [WhatsApp encryption]
works, because it says encryption is used, but when you access the
contact data, you can encrypt it again with some kind of code, so I
don’t get that. […] and you have to be in the same place to do that,
that’s very bothersome.”
Trust establishment. The participants proposed numerous ways
of authentication in electronic communication and provided 20
conceptual prototypes. We categorized the concepts into six meth-
ods of establishing trust: (1) shared knowledge: comparing knowl-
edge that is only known to the conversation partners, (2) picture-
based: showing pictures or videos of conversation partners, (3) so-
cial: asking friends or trusted contacts if they have authenticated
the conversation partner, (4) institutional: trusting institutions to
correctly authenticate people, (5) habituation: building up trust in
the identity of the conversation partner over long periods of time,
and (6) measurement-based: using technological measurements to
test if the conversation could currently be under attack. Fifteen
of the suggested prototypes were from the first three categories,
which suggests that these come more intuitively to mind than oth-
ers. The other three categories of trust establishment were not as
popular and only had one or two suggestions each.
Shared Knowledge: Nine out of ten participants proposed an iden-
tificationmethod based on shared knowledge immediately afterwe
confronted them with the possibility of communicating with an
intruder. The three most common concepts were: (1) exchanging
a password used for accessing conversation, (2) agreeing on code
words and communicating using Spy Speak (a common TV trope),
and (3) asking personal questions that only the other could answer.
They reported high confidence in these methods, since they as-
sume that only their conversation partner knows the agreed code
words or can answer the personal questions.
Picture-based: Six participants suggested a picture-based authen-
tication of conversation partners and three of them provided a
conceptual prototype for this method. Participants suggesting this
were quite confident that they were talking to the right person
afterwards, since they usually knew the face of their communi-
cation partners. However, most of them noticed that an attacker
could spoof pictures. Therefore, the resulting trust would increase
if senders could prove that the pictures are recent or if real-time
communication, i.e. a video-chat, is used.
Social: All participants reported everyday life situations inwhich
they receive information about identities and trust from their so-
cial contacts, but most were uncertain how this process of estab-
lishing social trust could be translated to electronic communica-
tion. The three participants who provided a conceptual prototype
for social authentication wanted the messaging client to automat-
ically establish which of their contacts is trusted by one or more
friends. The participants reported that the resulting trust from so-
cial authentication would be medium to low, suggesting that social
authentication can only be part of a more extensive authentication
concept and that trust transitivity highly depends on the friend
who verified the contact.
Institutional: During the discussion about establishing trust in
the offline world, five participants mentioned that they would ask
for some form of institutional identification card. Two other partic-
ipants said that in business scenarios they would check the name
tag of their conversation partner to establish the person’s name
and their affiliation. This form of trust is based on the issuing orga-
nization: if a bank or a government vouches for someones identity,
the trust in the organization is transferred to the person in ques-
tion. However, none of the participants had a suggestion on how to
translate this form of trust establishment to electronic communica-
tion, which means that we did not receive a conceptual prototype
for this form of trust.
Habituation: Offline relationshipswith neighbors, colleagues, and
even bank employees indicate that some kind of trust can be built
up over time. Almost all participants said that this is not a fool-
proofway of establishing trust, but that they nonetheless depended
on this method in some ways. Participants usually agreed that this
method could be useful in electronic communication as well. They
said that time builds valid identities because information collected
over time can be matched with information from other sources.
Measuring this trust involves either counting the number of mes-
sages between conversation partners or measuring the time since
the last key change.
Measurement-based: Even participants who are reluctant to con-
duct authentication ceremonieswith every contactmight still want
to verify the communication security in more sensitive circum-
stances. Testing based trust establishment reflects this belief and
offers different ways to test the communication channel for eaves-
droppers. Approaches to testing-based trust were mostly technol-
ogy based, one included meeting up and comparing the received
messages in order to reveal if any manipulations took place, and
another checked the quality of transmission.
Drawings. In the following, we present three conceptual proto-
types based on most frequent coding categories. We translated the
participants’ pen and paper drawings to English.
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Figure 2: In-person meeting for exchanging a passphrase
that protects against attackers.
Figure 3: Conversation partners need a previously ex-
changed password to access the conversation.
Figure 2 shows a prototype based on shared knowledge. Two
communicating partnersmeet in person and exchange a passphrase,
which one of them uses to upload a document afterwards. Only the
person who knows the passphrase word can download the docu-
ment at a later point in time. As the code word is negotiated offline,
attackers do not know the passphrase, assuming security proper-
ties are resistant to guessing. Figure 3 shows the corresponding
UI, a conversation that is inaccessible until the password has been
entered without exceeding the limit of guesses.
Picture-based authentication ceremonies assume that seeing the
actual person invokes trust in the person’s identity. A major prob-
lem with this approach is spoofing. As a mitigation strategy one
participant proposed to request images showing the communica-
tion partner performing a specified task. Figure 4 on this page
shows an example of such a task used as an encryption code. How-
ever, the participant who designed this method was not fully con-
vinced about the resistance to image manipulations.
All workshop participants preferred automatic to manual social
authentication, but had difficulties drawing an automatic process.
Most of them focused on the visualization of trust levels in the UI.
Figure 5 in the Appendix shows the use of color codes correspond-
ing to the trust status associated with a particular contact. Green
was used for trusted friends, yellow for contacts that have been
authenticated by trusted friends, and red was used for all other
contacts. The designer emphasized that a trust network should be
Figure 4: Conversation partners authenticate each other by
taking pictures of themselves executing a task defined by
the other partner.
Figure 5: A contact list showing the origin of trust informa-
tion and color-coded entries based on the trust status.
shallow, i.e. trust information should always come from a trusted
friend. Multiple layers of trust inheritance are confusing for users
and reduce the confidence in the result. The proposed trust level
for “vouched for by a trusted friend” was suggested as medium to
high, which seems promising for a method without required user
interaction.
5 NARROWING DOWN THE DESIGN SPACE
The collaborative design workshop resulted in 20 conceptual de-
signs and qualitative data about different authentication schemes
in the offline and online world. One of the authors, a security and
privacy professional with experience in the industry (2 years) and
academia (2 years), narrowed down this design space based on the
following criteria: (1) How common is the suggestion? and (2) Is it
possible to actualize the perceived security of the concept design?
The first criterion assumes that suggestions are common because
many people understand them intuitively, making them valuable
as an authentication ceremony for the general population.The sec-
ond criterion combines the users’ tacit knowledge about authenti-
cation with the researcher’s experience with security and privacy
technology. We excluded conceptual designs which the security
professional could not match to appropriate security mechanisms.
In the following, we present the three chosen conceptual designs
with corresponding threat models and security mechanisms.
Shared knowledge→ Combination lock. Themost common con-
cept design is based on shared knowledge. In those designs, partici-
pants suggested sharing a code word or a passphrase which is then
used to control access to the conversation. There are two kinds
of threats against this kind of authentication: (1) attackers guess
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a weak password, or (2) attackers intercept the password while
users exchange it. As a countermeasure, this concept suggests pass-
words and not allow users to exchange the password in-band. The
Socialist-Millionaire-Protocol (SMP)which is currently used by the
Off-the-Record protocol [2] can be used to implement this concept.
It is an online protocol that provides a zero-knowledge proof that
both parties possess the same secret without actually disclosing
any information about the secret. As Alexander et al. [2] men-
tioned, even secrets with a very low entropy are secure against
offline dictionary or brute-force attack. Boudot et al. [6] provides
a full security analysis. Based on this scheme we propose a proto-
type utilising the concept of combination locks, where all conversa-
tion participants have to set their combination lock to the shared
secret before they can join the conversation. We continue to de-
velop this proposal using iterative storyboard prototyping in the
next section.
Picture-based→ Selfies. Several participantsmentioned that send-
ing each other pictures of themselves establishes trust in the con-
versation partner’s identity. Since the pictures are transmitted in-
band, a targeted attacker could manipulate the pictures in real-
time or use past pictures for authentication. However, the con-
cept would provide security against simple large-scale attacks such
as the crackdown on IronChat by the Dutch Police in 2018 [19].
This method encodes information about key fingerprints into ges-
tures. Therefore, recipients of those pictures verify not only the
identity of the person they are talking to, but also that a person
uses the same key material as them. Adoption of this authentica-
tionmethod could be negatively impacted if users need to compare
more than five pictures. Assuming a gesture alphabet of size 32, it
is possible to compare 15 to 30 bit of the key material using this ap-
proach. Based on this scheme we propose a prototype utilising the
concept of selfies, where conversation participants have to provide
a series of selfies to others to authenticate themselves.We continue
to develop this proposal using iterative storyboard prototyping in
the next section.
Institutional → ID cards. Most participants were familiar with
ID cards as a way to authenticate other people. The process of
showing each other an ID card is well-established in the offline
world and we consider this mode of authentication well-aligned
with common approaches to key authentication. Messengers that
implement this need to provide a user interface that mimics an ID
card that users can show each other. Since users have to meet in
person to check their ID cards (simulated in the UI), attackers can-
not influence the authentication process as long as the devices are
not compromised. The security is based on key verification, which
works by comparing the encryption keys of the conversation part-
ners over a secure channel. This is achieved by integrating a QR
code of the key fingerprint into the simulated ID card (refer to (c)
in Figure 6). In this case, they meet in person and the compare keys
automatically as suggested by Tan et al. [39]. Based on this scheme
we propose a prototype utilising the concept of ID cards, where con-
versation participants have to verify the others’ simulated ID card
in the messaging app. We continue to develop this proposal using
iterative storyboard prototyping in the next section.
6 ITERATIVE STORYBOARD PROTOTYPING
Narrowing down the design space resulted in three design con-
cepts with corresponding threat models and security mechanisms.
We developed detailed storyboard prototypes for each of them us-
ing Sketch, a vector graphics editor that supports user interface
prototyping. Each storyboard starts in an unauthenticated state
and ends in an authenticated state. Each state of the user inter-
face, i.e. changes after each tap, is included as its own still image
in these storyboards.
We used an iterative approach with alternating field-work and
revision of the prototypes. During the field-work, we explained
a scenario to the participant and conducted a walk-through of the
storyboard prototype. For each element of the storyboardwe asked
the participants to describe what they see and what they would
do next. We noted hesitation and obvious confusion as an implicit
feedback in the field notes and asked the participants explicitly
about it afterwards. After the walk-through, we asked questions
to explore the participants’ understanding of the prototype. We
asked them (1) how they would describe the authentication pro-
cess to a friend, (2) to describe how the process affects the secu-
rity of the conversation, (3) to rate trust in the additional security
on a 10-point Likert scale. After reflecting on the security of the
process we encouraged all participants to redesign all storyboard
prototypes, we emphasized that they could change the design, the
phrasing, the order of the screens, or add additional screens. Par-
ticipants marked their suggested changes directly on the printed
storyboard prototypes. We noted all answers in the corresponding
field notes. Since the prototyping sessions were conducted in a dif-
ferent language the researchers translated the field notes and the
prototype annotations prior to the analysis. We used an online sur-
vey to collect demographics (age, gender, study program, type of
occupation, and responses to the affinity for technology interac-
tion (ATI) scale [16]).
We extractedmisconceptions,most frequentlymade suggestions,
and improvements without negative side-effects from the resulting
feedback. We used those suggestions and adapted the storyboard
prototypes accordingly. After we improved all storyboard proto-
types we recruited new participants in the field and started a new
iteration of the prototyping approach.
Recruitment and participants. Twomembers of our department’s
administrative staff participated in a pilot-study. Their results are
included in the final result as no changes were made, except for
minor adjustments in the field notes template. We recruited par-
ticipants around our university’s main plaza. All participants pro-
vided verbal consent. We compensated them for their time with a
candy bar. 𝑁 = 18 people provided feedback in the storyboard
prototyping process. The participants’ age was between 17 and
50 (m=26.545, sd=9.136), 33.3% of them were women and 66.6% of
them were men. About a third (27.3%) of the participants were not
studying or declined to answer the question about their field. Only
one participant studied a STEM program. One third of the partici-
pants were students, a third was employed, 26.7%were out of work,
and one participant was self-employed.The average ATI score was
4.128 (sd=0.763), which indicates an affinity for technology inter-
action slightly above the average population score (3.5 [16]).
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6.1 Results
Perceived security and trust. Since authentication ceremonies of-
ten need the cooperation of two users it is necessary that users are
able to describe ceremonies in simple terms. The majority (13) of
participants provided short and functional descriptions, the oth-
ers either responded with step-by-step explanations (4) or an ex-
planation why they would not use such a ceremony (1). Eleven
participants said that the ceremony had a positive effect on secu-
rity, four did not know, two thought it would impact security neg-
atively, and one would not use such a ceremony. To quantify the
perceived security we asked participants to rate the increased se-
curity on a scale from 1 to 10. The selfies based prototype received
the highest average score of 7.08, the combination lock and the
ID card prototype received a lower but similar score (6.08 and 6.2).
When we asked about the participants’ reasons for their assess-
ment, some described the strengths of an approach “being hard
and time-consuming to fake the process” (P10) or remained cau-
tious “one can never be entirely sure”.
User-reported usability issues. Theparticipants’ feedback contained
two categories of problems: (1) they wanted either more informa-
tion, or (2) they wanted to improve the user interface flow. In the
first category, the warning message that notifies them was the
most common topic. Participants wanted to change its placement,
color, the information contained, or the kind of buttons included
in it. Another major concern was the kind of visualisation of a
successful authentication: participants suggested different colors,
symbols, or obvious messages to do that. In the second category,
the user interface flow, participants wanted to simplify and stream-
line the ceremonies. Their suggestions were concerned with reduc-
ing the amount of actions they had to do manually. Additionally,
they wanted more information on their progress and wanted to
change the visible buttons to make it easier for them to navigate
through the ceremonies. Two participants also wanted to change
input fields, because they felt more comfortable with pin entry
pads than with number wheels.
Social and cultural issues. For the authentication prototype based
on personal pictures, we selected an alphabet of 32 gestures. We se-
lected gestures that are easy to do with one hand, that are easy to
recognize, and that do not have any negative political or insulting
meanings. However, during the storyboard prototyping iterations
we found that our curated list still contains gestures with negative
meaning depending on cultural context.
6.2 UX Expert Feedback
Asking potential users to give design feedback is helpful because
it gives them a concrete method to describe what they understand,
what aspects irritated them, and how they would resolve those
problems. In most cases, we cannot implement the participants’
design suggestions without further consideration. After a total of
𝑁 = 18 participants and two iterations of storyboard prototyping,
we did not encounter any new types of problems or design sug-
gestions from our participants. We involved a UX expert to help
us improve the user interface design further. The UX expert that
we recruited from our institution has several years of experience
in UX design for different research facilities. In the first meeting,
we presented and explained the storyboard prototypes, provided
information about the design process, and discussed the feedback
we received from the participants. After themeeting, the UX expert
annotated all storyboard prototypes in detail and gave suggestions
for improvements. In the second meeting, we discussed the anno-
tated storyboard prototypes and resolved misunderstandings.
TheUX expert gave feedback on the design of the authentication
ceremonies themselves, as well as themotivational cues in themes-
senger’s interface. Regarding the authentication ceremonies, we
implemented the following suggestions: a radical reduction of text
on each screen, reduction of visual noise in the interface, consis-
tent placement of icons, and communicating only one aspect per
screen with consistent use of progress visualization.They also sug-
gested using imagery and animations to communicate that security
“happens” in the background, similar to the approach by Distler et
al.[13]. However, we did not implement this suggestion since we
could not decide on fitting imagery and our paper-based prototyp-
ing approach does not work well with animations.
The UX expert also provided feedback on the motivational cues
in the messenger’s interface that lead up to the authentication cer-
emony. We implemented their suggestion to visualize the security
status before and after security actions in a consistent manner.
Additionally, we discussed several issues with the security warn-
ing message.The UX expert suggested avoiding the advertisement-
banner effect by integrating the warning into the conversation it-
self. The messenger could force users to pay attention to the warn-
ing by requiring interaction, such as a slider or a finger tap, to
access information. While we did not implement these suggested
changes to the warning message, we consider them an interesting
future research direction.
At the end of the second meeting, the UX expert suggested sev-
eral sources of design inspiration, helpful books, and design tools
that could help in the future. Figure 6 shows impressions of the
three resulting prototypes.
7 EVALUATION
During the collaborative design workshops, we found that (1) par-
ticipants who understood the purpose and consequence of the cer-
emony were willing to invest an additional effort for some of their
contacts, and (2) some participants felt reassured about the security
if they were able to participate in the security process. Therefore,
a good authentication ceremony provides users with an intuition
about the security it provides in different situations, and also in-
creases the users’ perceived security.
Procedure. Weconducted a between-subjects online survey (𝑁 =
131) on Amazon MTurk and randomly assigned participants to
one of four conditions. The four conditions include the three de-
veloped prototypes and Signal’s current authentication ceremony
in the same presentation format and design language as the other
prototypes. All click-through prototypes are provided in the sup-
plementary material.
At the start of the survey, we presented the same messaging-
related scenario to all participants.This scenario introduces a threat
model: the potential risk of losing one’s job if the messages are in-
tercepted or sent to the wrong person – this was chosen since (a)
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Figure 6: Impression of the prototypes’ authentication interaction between the fictional characters Malin (blue) and Daniel
(magenta).
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Table 1: The quantitative responses (SUS, UEQ-S, perceived security, and security ratings against threat models) in all four
conditions.
Combination Lock Selfies ID Cards Signal’s
Participants 35 38 30 28
avg. std. avg. std. avg. std. avg. std.
SUS 55.93 15.12 50.07 12.73 54.25 15.48 52.14 16.39
UEQ-S 1.42 0.83 1.24 0.90 1.12 1.02 1.26 1.05
Perceived Security 5.60 1.13 4.92 1.35 5.26 1.46 5.39 1.23
Threat Models 4.84 0.76 4.24 1.13 4.32 1.07 4.81 0.81
Table 2: Separate one-way univariate analyses (ANOVA) on the individual outcome measures.
Outcome Measure Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p partial 𝜂2
SUS 694.6 3 231.54 1.0186 .77 .0235
UEQ-S 1.437 3 0.4790 0.5187 .77 .0121
Perceived Security 8.841 3 2.9471 1.7035 .51 .0387
Threat Models 9.972 3 3.3241 3.4762 .07 .0759 .
Sign. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
it could have serious consequences, (b) it is a common enough sit-
uation s.t. participants are able to immerse themselves into it. The
scenario also introduces the notion of an authentication ceremony
and links the participants to a randomly assigned condition. Each
of the four conditions shows a storyboard of an authentication cer-
emony. Participants may click anywhere to receive an indication
of the clickable features in each still image. After the participants
complete the authentication ceremony, we link them to the eval-
uation survey. The survey covers the following four quantitative
measures: (1) SUS (10 items): evaluation the prototypes’ usability
using the Systems Usability Scale (SUS), (2) UEQ-S (8 items): eval-
uation of the prototypes’ user experience using the User Experi-
ence Questionnaire (UEQ-S), (3) Perceived Security (1 item): partic-
ipants’ rating of their conversation’s general security after com-
pleting the ceremony [7-point Likert scale], and (4) Threat Mod-
els (5 items): participants’ rating of security that their ceremony
provides against five attackers with different capabilities [7-point
Likert scale] (detailed items in the supplementary material). Even
though users’ perceptions on security or the threat models are not
necessarily accurate, they will affect how often and for which pur-
pose they will use authentication ceremonies. We also collected
qualitative information on (1) the participants’ reasons for their
perceived security, and (2) the participants’ contacts they would
consider authenticating in the future. Additionally, we asked for
information on messengers used, whether they have seen an au-
thentication ceremony before, and if they would conduct an au-
thentication ceremony in the future. To show the validity of our
sample, we also measured the affinity for technology interaction
(ATI) scale. The full questionnaire is included in the supplemen-
tary material.
Analysis. Wehypothesized that participantswho experience one
of the three developed prototypes will have an increased percep-
tion of security and an improved understanding of the type of
threat models they protect against – when compared to Signal’s
current authentication ceremony.
We use a MANOVA to measure the global effects of the choice
of prototypes on the four outcomemeasures (SUS,UEQ-S, Perceived
security, andThreat Models). We apply separate univariate analyses
tomeasure the effect of the prototypes on each of the outcomemea-
sures. In case of a significant statistical effect on the outcome mea-
sures, we use pairwise planned contrasts between the developed
prototypes and the control group to understand which prototypes
is responsible for this effect.The required sample size for a medium
effect size of 𝑓 2 (𝑉 ) = 0.625 and a 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 0.95 is 144 participants,
which was our lower bound recruitment goal. We used open coding
to analyse the free text responses to the qualitative questions. One
researcher coded all answers, thereby creating the initial codebook
consisting of 15 codes. A different researcher used this codebook
to code all answers independently. This resulted in an inter-rater
agreement of Cohen’s 𝜅 = 0.69, which is a satisfactory agreement.
Recruitment and participants. We conducted a pilot test with
two participants to refine our survey and to determine participant
compensation based on completion time (10 resp. 15 minutes). We
implemented their minor suggestions for improvements in the fi-
nal version of the study.
For the final study, we recruited participants on AmazonMTurk.
We required a 99% approval rate for past assignments. We paid
each participant USD 2.50 which results in a USD 10 per hour
wage. We received a total of 217 completed questionnaires. 82 par-
ticipants were already familiar with one of the study’s conditions,
because they had seen Signal’s authentication ceremony before.
Four participants failed the two Likert scale attention check ques-
tions (taken from Huang et al. [24]). After removing them, our fi-
nal dataset consists of 𝑁 = 131. The participants’ average age was
30.58 (𝑠𝑑 = 8.10). About two-thirds (63%) of them were men, about
one-third (36%) were women, and one person (1%) was non-binary.
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The majority (66%) of participants had a college degree, 12% had
a vocational degree, 19% completed high-school, and 3% did not
complete high-school or preferred not to say. The average ATI
score (3.58) is near the expected average of 3.5 [16]. Participants
reported using on average 2.48 (𝑠𝑑 = 1.24) messengers (most com-
monlyWhatsApp, iMessage, and Telegram). 12.97% of themwould
authenticate most or all of their contacts. The rest would authen-
ticate on average 5.16 (𝑠𝑑 = 2.94) of their contacts. The supple-
mentary material includes a table with all collected demographic
information.
7.1 Results
Participants experience one of the prototypes (Combination Lock,
Selfies, ID Cards) or the reference prototype modeled after Signal’s
ceremony. Each of the four groups had 28 to 38 participants. The
average affinity for technology interaction (ATI) in each groupwas
similar and ranged from 3.53 to 3.67, whereby 3.5 is the expected
average [16].
Quantitative responses. Participants evaluated the prototype’s
usability (SUS) and user experience (UEQ-S). The prototypes’ SUS
scores ranged from 50.07 to 55.93. SUS scores above 71 are con-
sidered acceptable and scores below 51.7 are considered unaccept-
able [5, 33]. The prototypes’ UEQ-S scores ranged from 1.12 to
1.42. Values range from -3 (horribly bad) to +3 (extremely good),
whereby results above +0.8 indicate a positive evaluation.
To understand the participants’ perceptions of the prototypes’
security benefits we asked them to rate their perceived security
on a 7-point Likert scale, and rate (again on a 7-point Likert scale)
the respective ceremony’s effectiveness against five specific threat
models. The prototypes’ perceived security ranged from 4.92 to
5.60. The participants’ rating of security against the five threat
models ranged from 4.24 to 4.81, whereby a rating of 7 indicates
confident and correct evaluation of security in all cases. The calcu-
lated Cronbach’s alpha for these five threat models items is 𝜌𝑇 =
0.83 which indicates good (0.8 < 𝜌𝑇 < 0.9) internal consistency.
Table 1 provides an overview of the resulting measurements.
Statistical tests. Using Roy’s largest root, there was a significant
global effect of the experienced authentication ceremony on the
outcome measures, 𝜃 = 0.09, 𝐹 (4, 126) = 2.702, 𝑝 = .03, 𝜂p2 =
.07891.
To find out which of the four outcome measures (SUS, UEQ-
S, Perceived Security, and Threat Models) is affected by the differ-
ent authentication ceremonies we ran separate one-way ANOVAs
on them. After applying Holm-Bonferroni correction, these sep-
arate univariate analyses revealed a marginally significant effect
on the outcome measure Threat Models, 𝐹 (3, 127) = 3.48, 𝑝 = .07,
𝜂p2 = .07591. Table 2 shows the results of separate ANOVAs for
all outcome measures.
We used planned contrasts (with a separate linear regression
model) between the different ceremonies to find out which of the
ceremonies affected the outcome measure Threat Models. These
planned contrasts with Signal’s authentication ceremony revealed
that (a) the combination lock ceremony significantly improved the
1Calculated partial eta squared s.t. .06 < 𝜂p2 < .14 are considered medium effect
sizes.
Table 3: Planned contrasts on the outcome measure Threat
Models using a separate linear regression model.
Contrast Estimate Std. Error t p
(Constant) 4.55231 0.08606 52.895 <.001 ***
CL vs. SI 0.28769 0.14515 1.982 .049 *
SE vs. SI -0.31021 0.14138 -2.194 .03 *
ID vs. SI -0.23231 0.15279 -1.520 .13
Sign. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Abbr.: CL = Combination Lock, SE = Selfies, ID = ID Card,
SI = Signal’s
outcome measure Threat Models, 𝑡 (127) = 1.982, 𝑝 = .049 (one-
tailed), and (2) that the selfies-based ceremony significantly wors-
ened the outcome measure Threat Models, 𝑡 (127) = −2.194, 𝑝 =
.03. Table 3 shows the result of all planned contrasts on the out-
come measure Threat Models.
Qualitative responses. We asked all participants to provide a rea-
son for their perceived security rating.The responses to the combi-
nation lock-based prototype included rather detailed explanations,
many of them stating that the security of the conversation is based
on the knowledge of the access code: “Only the person with the code
can access the conversation.” (P75). One participant thought 4-digits
might be too short for security and another one thought about the
difficulties to distribute the shared knowledge in a secure manner.
Participants who saw the selfies-based prototype felt reassured by
the pictures of the communication partners, but commonly had
a problem to connect this with confidentiality: “I can understand
the confirmation of the person on the other end. I can see how the
ceremony confirms the party you are communicating with. I have
trouble understanding how the data is further secured in the space
in between.” (P85) The ID card based prototype resulted in miscon-
ceptions about the security implications of the authentication cer-
emony. Participants assumed that it could be stolen or copied, con-
trary to the technical reality.
Necessary additional interactions conveyed a feeling of improved
security. Several participants connected the action of scanning QR
codes with added security: “Due to the double QR code verification
(the two participating phones mutually scanning each other)” (P25).
However, since one participantmentioned that scanning aQR code
does nothing for security, this reasoning is potentially shaped by
prior experience or knowledge. Many participants also explained
why they did not fully trust the authentication ceremony: “How-
ever, I do know that there will be that small section of individuals
that would still be able to hack this system if they really wanted to.”
(P81) Some of those participants described threat models (such as a
conversation partner forwarding information) and others just over-
estimated the capabilities of attackers.
8 LIMITATIONS
Improving authentication ceremonies is a long-standing challenge
and several approaches have already been applied to it with limited
success. We explore how a different design approach, namely User-
Centered Design, is applicable in this case despite its drawbacks.
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We hope that the lessons we learned during this study start a dis-
course on the benefits and pitfalls of applying this design approach
to security.
Necessarily, User-Centered Design studies focus on the goals and
requirements of users – who then severely influence outcomes.
We recruited participants for our collaborative design workshops
and iterative storyboard prototyping sessions in stable, economi-
cally rich countries of the global north. This population faces few
threats in their daily life – which influences the resulting proto-
types. These participants were also not security or design experts,
and we did not expect them to come up with technical secure con-
cepts. Instead, we explicitly included security and design experts
in our design method. However, users are experts when it comes
to their perceptions, values, intentions, and mental models – and
User-Centered Design can help to incorporate this expertise into
designs that work for users, not against them.
Many authentication ceremonies require in-personmeetings even
though users’ need for additional security arises in the moment.
Ensuring secure conversations requires planning these in-person
meetings ahead of time, which might decrease the usefulness of
the authentication ceremony to regular users. We did not prescribe
one type of ceremony, since we did not want to restrict the partic-
ipants’ intuitions. Qualitative results (in Section 4 and 7) suggest
that in-person meetings build trust in the security mechanism.
Collaborative design workshop participants need a grasp of the
security issues in order to suggest solutions. We used a slide show
(included in the supplementary material) to explain these issues in
high-level terms to them. The resulting prototypes did not include
these explanations, since (a) we cannot expect users to read them
(outside of a lab environment), and (b) the user experience should
communicate the prototypes’ security implications.
Our evaluation used a scripted online experience instead of a
lab study. Previous work [3, 7] found that remote asynchronous
usability testing discovers fewer usability issues than lab testing,
which is offset by easier participant recruitment. However, our
main concern is not usability testing but rather the users’ compre-
hension of the ceremonies’ security implications. Encouragingly,
Wu et al. [46] used a similar approach to evaluate their authenti-
cation ceremony designs. We assume that the effects found in a
scripted online experience should be even more pronounced in a
real-world scenario.
9 DISCUSSION
We begin this section by discussing lessons learned from applying
a user-centered design process to a well-researched security prob-
lem in secure instant messaging, and then continue to discuss un-
expected findings and how these results fit into the existing related
work.
9.1 Methodological Lessons We Learned about
User-Centered Security Design
Weexplored howuser-centered and participatory design techniques
can be applied to a well-studied security problem. From this explo-
ration, we learned how some aspects worked out better than we
expected and which aspects we would have approached differently
in hindsight.
Framing of the design problem affects the entire design process.
The framing of the initial design problem impacts the entire design
process and its outcomes. It specifies which strategies and which
kinds of solutions are suitable for the problem at hand – and who
should contribute in which manner they are allowed to contribute.
Hence, this framing should be chosen carefully and explicitly.
We based our design problem entirely on previous research on
authentication ceremonies in secure instant messaging. This was
possible since this niche-problem has already been studied exten-
sively and the continuing issues are well-documented. This is a
valid and common approach in research, however, it also means
that assumptions from previous research also influenced our work.
A different approach of framing a design problem in secure in-
stant messaging could have involved asking participants with an
increased reliance on security (e.g. activists, members of oppressed
minorities, health-care workers, sex-workers, …) about their day-
to-day uncertainties and fears about secure communication.
Explicit choice of participants is necessary. Working with a uni-
versal definition of an unmarked user has been a problem in the
first wave of HCI [9]. Similarly, it is a commonly observed issue in
User-Centered Design that designers tend to imagine users that are
similar to themselves [10, 30]. This erases the challenges of groups
that are unlike the involved designers, and reinforce the societal
power hierarchy.
To avoid unmarked users in design studies for security, we sug-
gest keeping the following groups in mind: affected users, ideal-
istic users, and non-users. Ermoshina et al. [15] differentiated be-
tween users with specific and concrete threat models, who were
consequently invested in learning and using security tools, and
users with very abstract threat models who had an interest in secu-
rity tools but used them more for emotional and idealistic reasons
than fearing concrete negative effects. Since the security and use-
fulness of some security tools rely on the number of total users,
it is equally important to focus on the attitudes and requirements
of non-users [35]. All three groups need to be involved to build
widely-deployed security mechanisms that provide meaningful se-
curity against various kinds of users’ threat models.
In our design process, we did not focus on users with specific
threatmodels inmind, instead, our recruitment efforts yieldedmostly
idealistic users with rather abstract threat models. In hindsight,
this allowed us to focus more on user comprehension and moti-
vational aspects – assuming that affected users are usually moti-
vated and more concerned with issues of usability. Our choice of
participants also enabled us to find social and cultural aspects to
the design of authentication ceremonies: (1) that requesting an au-
thentication might seem like a sign of distrust in the conversation
partner, (2) that they might feel pressured to provide a reason for
their authentication request, or (3) that they might be expected
to explain how the ceremony works when they actually do not
know. One participant of the iterative storyboard prototyping ses-
sions did not like the concept of the selfies-based prototype. They
thought that sending selfies of themselves comes across as nar-
cissistic or that some of the gestures are inappropriate depending
on the cultural context. Even though our selection of participants
worked out well in our case, we would approach the question of
suitable participants with more care in future design studies.
Exploring User-Centered Security Design for Usable Authentication Ceremonies CHI ’21, May 8–13, 2021, Yokohama, Japan
Clear expectations from participants’ involvement in the security
design process. In the beginning, we did not have a clear expecta-
tion of our participants’ conceptual designs – misleading us about
the work that would still remain in subsequent design stages. This
early learning experience led us to include an explicit security eval-
uation and feedback from a UX expert into the design process.
Designers need to have clear expectations of which expertise
participants can bring to the design process. They account from
their lived experience to inform the design process about problems
with existing approaches, currentworkarounds, and the users’ threat
models. Participants can also provide intuitions about security pro-
cedures they would expect to see or that they would find especially
convincing. Our collaborative design workshops provide evidence
for that, seeing that the resulting prototypes are novel and engag-
ing. Additionally, participants can provide insights on secure expe-
riences after they experience them. This works either by using tra-
ditional interview techniques or redesigning the low-fidelity pro-
totypes themselves. The latter approach is especially useful when
participants have difficulties expressing their desired changes ver-
bally.
However, we need to stress again that participants cannot pro-
vide expertise on security, usability, or user experience design.The
results from our collaborative design workshops included several
designs that were not secure and very hard to implement securely
at all. Consequently, expertise in these areas has to come from
other involved parties.
Focus on qualitative evaluation in the prototyping phase. AsGreen-
berg et al. [21] noted that HCI papers tend to quantitatively evalu-
ate early designs even when a qualitative approach would be more
appropriate. Throughout our design process, we observed that the
qualitative, rather than the quantitative, evaluation of our proto-
types provided more thorough and actionable information about
their underlying issues and benefits. A particularly relevant ex-
ample is the participants’ mental association of the user experi-
ence with the achieved levels of security. While we could tell from
quantitative measures that participants believed in a prototype’s
security, we required qualitative data to understand the reasons
for these beliefs. These reasons were sometimes unintended, unex-
pected, and consequently, insightful. In the future, we would fo-
cus more on qualitative evaluations of our early designs instead of
comparing prototypes quantitatively early on.
9.2 Outcomes from our Endeavour to Design
Appropriate Authentication Ceremonies
Unexpected findings regarding our resulting prototypes. In hind-
sight, two unexpected findings add necessary context to the re-
sulting prototypes and their evaluation results: (1) Qualitative re-
sults suggest that participants strongly associate the act of scan-
ning QR codes with security – which means that QR codes poten-
tially evoke a perception of security even without understanding
the security mechanism itself. This association would have influ-
enced the evaluation of the ID card prototype and Signal’s current
ceremony. (2) Reviewing the documentation from the collabora-
tive designworkshops, we note that participants either understood
MitM attacks as an impersonation attack or an interception attack
– both interpretations are incomplete but correct. Consequently,
we received some suggestions that protect against impersonatio-
nand others that protect against interception. Qualitative results
indicate that participants exposed to the selfies or the ID card proto-
types were confident about their contact’s identity but unsure how
the procedure protects against interception – even though it tech-
nically would. In contrast, participants that used the combination
lock prototype understood how it provides security even though
some thought 4-digit combinations were insufficient.
The iterative storyboard prototyping uncovered that adapting
the messengers’ UI flow (details are in the supplementary mate-
rial) can provide security guarantees. The combination lock pro-
totype locks users out of a conversation until they have entered
the correct access code.This design choice was consistent with the
workshop participants’ conceptual ideas. Since users in these sce-
narios are required to authenticate, the transmission of unauthen-
ticated messages indicates an ongoing MitM attack. Such a guaran-
tee based on messengers’ UI flow is a clear improvement over the
state-of-the-art.
Increasing adoption rates. Thecomparative evaluation of our pro-
totypes did not find improved usability or user experience. How-
ever, both are prerequisites for increased adoption rates. We found
three different explanations for this, each leading to another rem-
edy. Our prototypes could have improved the usability and user
experience in minor ways not detectable with our study’s num-
ber of participants. Such potential minor improvements could be
found with more participants. It is also possible that our online
user experience does not compare well to the physical counter-
part. Repeating the evaluation with high-fidelity Android-based
prototypes could provide more meaningful results for these two
measures since the experience would resemble real-world circum-
stances. We also consider the possibility that our comparatively
short user-centered design process might not be suited for gaining
usability improvements. Other complementary design approaches,
such as activity-centered design, could be applicable and improve
usability and user experience.
A broad social acceptance of authentication ceremonies is neces-
sary to increase adoption rates. Social acceptancemight be an issue
for our prototype based on sending selfies that show specific ges-
tures. Sending pictures containing silly gestures or even selfies to
contacts might be inappropriate depending on the cultural and so-
cial contexts. Hence, business-related authentication will require
different kinds of pictures than authentication amongst relatives
and friends.
Aspects such as discoverability, motivation, and nudges were
not our primary research goals. Nevertheless, they are crucial as-
pects of increasing adoption rates. Users could either plan their se-
curity ahead, regardless of their immediate requirements or they
(unexpectedly) require increased security in the moment of use.
Users that employ the first approach have a security motivation
but might need reminders at convenient times (motivation and
context-sensitive nudges). The second approach requires an under-
standing of the available security mechanisms and that users find
and use these mechanisms in an appropriate time-frame (under-
standing, discoverability, and usability). Most authentication cer-
emonies rely on a planned security approach because they often
rely on in-person meetings. However, ceremonies need to support
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both approaches to be useful in more situations and for more types
of users.
Our results in the context of related work. When Vaziripour et
al. [44] let their study participants authenticate their communi-
cation partners without telling them about authentication cere-
monies, they used several techniques that also came up during
our collaborative design workshops. Namely, send pictures, recog-
nize video, recognize voice, and shared knowledge. This overlap of
techniques suggests that these social approaches to authentication
might generalize to a larger population – a finding that could in-
form future authentication ceremonies.
Necessary additional interactions in the form of authentication
ceremonies boosted some of the participants’ perceived security.
Fully automatic authentication (e.g., with CONIKS [29]) wouldmake
these ceremonies superfluous, thereby reducing the perceived se-
curity for this population. However, most participants stated that
they would only authenticate friends, partners, and family – mak-
ing automatic approaches useful for other contacts.
10 CONCLUSION
Authentication ceremonies in secure instant messaging are a well-
researched security problem [22, 37, 39, 41–44, 46]. A few different
approaches (applying either systems design or activity-centered
design) have been explored to improve their usability and adop-
tion rate. Our user-centered design approach is based on the as-
sumption that fundamental improvements of these ceremonies re-
quire rethinking the entire design from the user’s perspective. We
used a four-stage design process including collaborative design
workshops, selecting viable candidates, iterative storyboard proto-
typing, and a mixed-methods online evaluation. Even though the
quantitative comparison of our prototypes did not reveal usabil-
ity or user experience improvements, we found that one of our
prototypes increases the users’ comprehension of the ceremonies’
security benefits.
We also learned several important lessons from applying user-
centered design to security problems: (1) Participants have impor-
tant participatory roles in the security design processes. Mainly
framing the design problem regarding threat models and social
aspects, informing designers and security experts about their in-
tuitions on convincing secure experiences, and improving proto-
types with their iterative feedback; (2) The choice of participants
needs to be explicit and consistent. The constructed notion of the
“universal user” could be combated by,e.g., differentiating users ac-
cording to the details of their threatmodels (concrete – abstract), or
by their current (non-)use of security features; and (3) Focusing on
qualitative evaluations is necessary to understand if participants
correctly associate the user experience with the achieved security
levels.
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